The Standard

STANDARD SAFETY

SETTING THE STANDARD FOR SERVICE AND SECURITY

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IN THIS EDITION

v An engineer at work in the engine room

In this *Standard Safety*, we look at the issue of the ISM Code and the introduction of a number of key revisions introduced by IMO that was effective from July 2010. As a club that actively carries out condition surveys and Member Risk Reviews, we acknowledge that these amendments are welcome; how well they are implemented and how effective they will be is an open question and depends very much on how well Flag or Class conduct their audits. We are grateful for Dr Phil Anderson from Consult ISM in giving an overview on the ISM Code changes.

We record in brief the outcome of the condition surveys carried out by the loss prevention department during the past 12 months.

We review also the requirements introduced at the beginning of 2010 relating to low sulphur fuel in ships' operation. Also, as a result of finding that a small but significant number of members do not carry out fuel oil analysis, we highlight the benefits of carrying out rigorous bunker fuel oil analysis. Although it may be considered a hull insurance matter, the operational and safety implications of fuel oil analysis cannot be underestimated. The impact on the safety of the ship is clearly apparent.

We also highlight an issue arising from an unfortunate incident which occurred during routine repairs that required welding in a container ship hold. A container near to where the welding was taking place contained scrap aluminium and, through a chemical reaction, produced hydrogen, which is highly flammable. An explosion occurred, resulting in an accident. Operators of container ships should take note.

We bring to members' attention the issue of tank entry. It is clear from our surveys that the safety issues surrounding enclosed space entry are still not fully understood by a significant number of personnel, particularly on dry cargo/bulk and container ships.

Also, we highlight the fact that during a small but significant number of surveys, we have come across evidence that the senior officers do not know how to operate the fixed CO_2 and other fire extinguishing systems.